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THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL

Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence:
Copper in Chile. By Theodore H. Moran. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1974. Pp. xiv, 286. Statistics, Appendices, Bibliography, $12.50.

Reviewed by JOHN D. HUSHON*
In this recent product of the Center for International Affairs
at Harvard University, Theodore Moran has expanded his valuable approach to the analysis of the peculiar "love-hate" relationship between the multinational enterprise and its less developed
country host, a concept first evidenced at the Aspen Institute in
September, 1973.1 A self-styled skeptic, Moran does an admirable
* Associate, Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotldn & Kahn, Washington, D.C.
1. Gunnemann, J. P., ed., The Nation State and Transnational Corporations in
Conflict, Praeger, 1975, pp. 20-25.
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job both as historian to the Chilean copper industry and as
political economist.
Copper in Chile is a classical economic analysis of several
decades in the evolution of the Chilean copper industry. This
study demonstrates that traditional economic constructs used to
measure the performance of an industrial enterprise (its investment decisions, its pricing policies, and its non-price, competitive
techniques) are equally applicable to the domestic corporation,
facing less-than-perfect competition, and the multinational enterprise in an international oligopolistic milieu. During the intense
period of Chileanization and nationalization of the copper mines,
and the immediate aftermath of inflammatory threats and
counterthreats, any dispassionate attempt by an American to
apply the rules of economic rationalism to an event of expropriation would have been immediately discounted. Now, however,
the study can be seen as a valuable review of a difficult experience.
The growth of economic nationalism and feelings of dependencia in Chile are traced from their early origins. One can
easily see how the endlessly repeated tales of the risks, problems
and courage of the early American explorers and the exorbitant
profits extracted would provide the growing group of nationalists
with a cause celebre. The institution and reinstitution of wartime
artificial price controls on copper at a period when foreign exchange was of extreme value to Chile's industrialization plans
(and often without consultation with Chilean officials), the seemingly extreme examples of market power forbearance exhibited
by the U.S. home office parents, and the suspicion of profit minimization in Chile through transfer pricing and forward integration
by the copper giants finally persuaded virtually all political
figures to conclude that Chile was being "raped" - even if
these charges might be somewhat lacking in economic factual
underpinning.
By the end of the Korean War, Chileans were ready to
assume a much stronger role in the exploitation of their copper
as a socio-political phenomenon, as a result of pure frustration
with the economics of copper, and given the rising level of Chilean
technical and fiscal expertise. The post-war marketing monopoly
may have been a failure, and the Nuevo Trato a temporary retreat, but the seeds of Chilean control were sown. By the late
1960s, nationalization was almost inevitable. The election of
Allende confirmed the trend.
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The copper industry in Chile provides a unique vehicle for
analysis. The catalog of control techniques used, with varying
success, by successive administrations in Chile to maximize the
economic and political return is itself educational. Chile, during
the last several decades, has fostered the development of a basic
industry with various tax and other incentives, permitted the
dictation of external price controls during wartime, engaged in
endless renegotiations of basic concession agreements, experimented with a state-owned marketing monopoly, demanded the
progressive Chileanization of the technological and managerial
personnel, experimented with classical laissez faire economic incentives in the Nuevo Trato, nationalized her basic industry, and
operated that industry within a weak oligopolistic marketing
system, both as a good and bad oligopolist. The Chilean experience provides a rich source of raw materials for the economic
analyst and a how-to-do-it book for third-world nations desiring
to maximize exploitation of natural resources for industrialization
and development.
The value of Moran's study, however, is not so much in the
accurate portrayal of the economic history of a major exploitive
industry in the underdeveloped world. Moran's objectives are
much broader. He desires to construct a predictive model so
that foreign host and multinational corporation alike may project
the scenario of their long-term relationship. Predictability, if not
security, is exceptionally important to the multinational corporation. Exploitive investment is necessarily long term in nature,
and will only be commenced if the multinational corporation has
some assurance of predictability, if not security. It might be
argued that the existence of international guarantee programs
for multinational investment have minimized the need for this
predictability. However, as any businessman will admit, the mere
existence of insurance is not sufficient to outweigh the total
unpredictability of the experience. The multinational enterprise
enters into investment for profits, not for recapture of investment
after extended debate with an international insurance agency.
If it cannot predict its long-run involvement, it will not begin
at all.
The model advanced in the study is a dynamic one, attempting to encompass political and economic uncertainties, and certain
readily predictable consequences of investment: the growth of
the technocracy of the host country, the multitudinous political
and social forces behind the national host country representative

BOOK REviEws
and the shifting balance of bargaining power. Moran suggests
that the relationship between the multinational enterprise and
the host country is likely to have relatively unpredictable "ups
and downs" resulting from domestic political instability, international warfare and economic dislocation, and the vagaries
associated with natural resource discovery, development and
exhaustion. However, he argues that the long-term relationship
is readily predictable.
At the concession stage, the multinational enterprise has
substantial bargaining power. It controls both the capital and
the technology required by the aspirant host. It can dictate
terms. As time goes on, however, the risks are reduced, or at
least quantifiable, nationals of the host acquire the necessary
expertise, and the host country becomes less willing to pay
extreme enterpreneurial rents. Thus, the long-term relationship
involves either successive adjustment to the new realization of
the relative bargaining power of the host and the multinational
enterprise or cataclysmic events, such as expropriation, if the
multinational enterprise refuses to adjust.
Moran concludes that the restraint in the exercise of bargaining power by the multinational enterprise in the first instance
and the installation of periodic relationship review mechanisms
in the initial agreement will forestall abrupt redresses of power
imbalance as the project matures. The model thus suggests that
if the exploitive multinational enterprise is not too greedy at first,
it will be rewarded later on. The flaw in this suggestion is, of
course, that the total return to the multinational enterprise may
ultimately be no greater in the aggregate through forbearance
and long-term "reasonable" profits than it would be if it pulled
out as much as it could initially, although the enterprise might
obtain some marginal public relations benefit from being the
"reasonable partner." Moreover, the host country might see the
initial forbearance as weakness. The negotiator will immediately
see the classic question: Shall a reasonable "final" solution be
proposed initially in the hopes of obtaining ready approval or
shall demand be made for substantially more than what is desired
with the expectation that the mutual give-and-take during the
negotiating process will result in a negotiated conclusion close to
minimum expectations?
However, Moran's suggestion of a mechanism for periodic
review, or even a mutual "buy-sell" clause, is well taken. Such
clauses have proven useful in many domestic and international
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joint venture situations. Moreover, they tend to recognize, at
least implicitly, the lawyer's reverence for contract. Experience
has also shown that, psychologically, if each contracting party
has a pre-established right to obtain adjustment or to "buy out"
the other, the relationship is more successful.
Unfortunately, for the underdeveloped countries, the consequence of economic nationalism and the repeated expropriation
of multinational enterprise properties is that those companies
which are most capable of aiding in development have shifted
their investment and expertise to more secure areas. Additionally,
companies involved in the exploitation of natural resources where
the geography of the resource placement prevents complete site
choice, have emphasized the cultivation and preservation of nonprice responsive commercial ties to enhance or maintain market
power vis-A-vis the host.
Copper in Chile does the underdeveloped world a great
service. It suggests that a long-term relationship between a
multinational enterprise and the host country can be predictable,
and any relationship that is predictable can be captured effectively
in a legal framework. American businessmen are more comfortable if they can operate within an established legal framework.
Thus, they may be induced to move into "insecure" investments.
Moran's study is recommended reading for legal negotiators, policy planners and corporate directors of multinational
operations.

